Therefore, the Team Commander, on his own initiative, seeking to minimize the serious risks to his force that were being ignored by higher command, contacted another U.S. However, unlike Shok Valley, ODA 3212′s higher command indicated it was unworthy of trust by providing no additional resources to mitigate risk. His recommendation, as with ODA 3336 and Shok Valley, was denied. The Team Commander, with agreement from the commander of the accompanying Niger partner force, recommended against the mission, citing several risk factors. The team was ordered to turn north and execute a new mission near the border with Mali. Only a few hours’ drive from mission completion, ODA 3212′s movement to home base was halted by its higher command. The mission had been planned by ODA 3212, mission taskings had been successfully executed, and ODA 3212 was returning to its base. 3, 2017, ODA 3212 had completed its mission taskings in the vicinity of the town of Tiloa. ODA 3336′s higher command proved itself worthy of trust by allocating assets for the mission that enabled the majority of the ODA and commandos to survive. After the mission, the team was not denigrated for a mission failure for which they bore no fault, and team members were honored with numerous and high awards for heroism. The mission failed, with a number of ODA members seriously wounded and three Afghans reportedly killed, but the unit survived, the wounded were medevac’d, and the ODA and commandos were able to be extracted, all because of the robust, immediately available, and continuous kinetic air support. However, ODA 3336 was able to call in immediate, robust and continuous kinetic air support. Shortly after heliborne insertion into the objective area, the mission quickly went awry when the ODA and Afghan commandos came under a coordinated attack from a numerically superior and well-positioned enemy force. However, to support the mission, an Air Force combat controller was attached to ODA 3336, and both airborne and on-call rotary and fixed-wing kinetic assets, along with responsive medevac assets, were integrated into the mission. His request was denied by his higher command. The Team Commander of ODA 3336, along with the commander of the Afghan commandos integrated into the ODA, were opposed to the mission, and the Team Commander requested that the mission be cancelled or postponed. As I listened to Ron, the stories of ODA 3336 in Shok Valley and ODA 3212 in Tongo Tongo seemed to share both similarities and differences, so in subsequent days I spent time looking at the details of the Shok Valley battle, to include reading about the details of the mission in the book “No Way Out”, authored by Mitch Weiss and Kevin Maurer. ![]() Ron was a medic with ODA 3336 during the Shok Valley mission, and was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. I became aware of the battle in Shok Valley when I met Ron Shurer in Puyallup, Washington, in December of 2019, when Ron was honored with a ceremony and memorial at his high school alma mater, Rogers High School. Lay out your concerns, and we will provide you with all available resources to mitigate risk and maximize success.” This second trust scenario appears to have been the case for ODA 3336 on April 6, 2008, for a mission to the Shok Valley, Afghanistan. For example, if a subordinate commander is assigned a mission, but considers the mission untenable and therefore recommends against it, trust might be the senior commander responding “Got it, we will cancel or delay the mission.” Or, in the same scenario trust might be the senior commander responding “Got it, but this is a ‘must do’ mission. ![]() From the military perspective, trust might be a senior commander listening to a subordinate commander.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |